We analyze non-cooperative R&D investment by two …rms that already hold patents that they can assert against each other with probabilistic success. The market structure results from stochastic innovation and patent litigation. Depending on the level of infringement fees, we highlight positive and negative e¤ects of litigation threats on innovation.
Introduction
Patents are meant to create incentives to invest in R&D by conferring property rights, including legal exclusivity on innovations. Yet in some cases patents may also represent an impediment for innovators. As products embody increasing numbers of patented components, especially in sectors such as semiconductors and computer hardware and software, it is often di¢ cult for an innovator to anticipate exactly what patents she might be infringing. Therefore innovators face a threat of patent litigation by other patent owners even though they did not knowingly imitate any patented technology. is being considered in the Congress that would require that damages awarded more accurately re ‡ect the actual harm caused by a patent infringement when the infringing product embodies a combination of several patented inventions.
In this paper, we study the interplay between hold-up litigation and investments in R&D, and propose a policy instrument to implement e¢ ciency. We consider …rms that develop innovations in the shadow of each other's patent portfolios. In the absence of litigation threats …rms play a standard R&D race in which they tend to overinvest. But this over-investment can eventually reverse as the threat of patent litigation erodes the incentives to innovate. We use this setting to evaluate the e¢ ciency of …rms'investments and address the problem of the optimal de…nition of infringement penalties. We …nd both proand anti-innovation e¤ects of overlapping patent portfolios, depending on the level of infringement penalties. We show that the possibility of hold-up can 1 The Patent Reform Act states that "the Court should conduct an analysis to ensure that a reasonable royalty [...] is applied only to that economic value properly attributable to the patent's speci…c contribution over the prior art." 4 actually facilitate the implementation of e¢ cient R&D investments, provided that infringement fees are small enough and the …rms'patent portfolios not too asymmetric.
The paper is structured as follows: We review the related literature in the next Section. We then introduce the model, our de…nition of social e¢ ciency and the decentralized equilibrium in Sections 3 and 4. We study the case of symmetric …rms in Section 5 before moving to the asymmetric case in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Related literature
Large overlapping patent portfolios are frequent in electronics and computer hardware and software, where they form "patent thickets" that …rms have to navigate (Shapiro, 2001) . 2 This situation results from a dramatic increase of …rms' patenting propensity during the last two decades (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Shapiro, 2001; FTC, 2003; Graham and Mowery, 2003) . 3 It can be seen as the outcome of a prisoner's dilemma (Bessen, 2003) , whereby …rms reply to patent infringement threats by …ling more patents, which they can use as counter threats. It generates transaction costs and double marginalization issues that reduce incentives to innovate. 4 It also generates legal uncertainty that, as we 2 More than "90,000 patents generally related to microprocessors are held by more than 10,000 parties", while "approximately 420,000 semiconductor and system patents [are] held by more than 40,000 parties" (FTC, 2003) . 3 The number of patents per million of U.S. dollars invested in R&D has doubled between 1982 and 1992 in the U.S. semiconductor industry (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001 ). Graham and Mowery (2003) …nd similar results for incumbent software …rms during the 1990's. 4 According to an industry executive, new semiconductor manufacturers must for instance pay $100 million to $200 million to license out-of-date manufacturing technologies (Hall and show in this paper, can a¤ect R&D competition in various ways.
When innovation is cumulative, it is well established that the risk of hold-up by an upstream patent owner can deter investments in downstream innovations (Scotchmer, 1991; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Bessen, 2004) . Green and Scotchmer (1995) show that this problem can be overcome if …rms successfully negotiate a licensing agreement before R&D costs are sunk. However such ex ante contracts are actually quite rare (Anand and Khanna, 2000) , because of information asymmetries with respect to existing patents (Reitzig et al., 2007) , or on the cost and value of the future innovation (Bessen, 2004; Llobet, 2003) .
We extend the analysis of patent hold-up to the case of competing …rms that own their respective patent portfolios and that invest simultaneously in R&D.
This approach can be related to an early paper by Fershtman and Kamien (1992) , in which …rms engage in parallel patent races for complementary innovations. Our model is, however, closer to Bessen (2003) and Bessen and Hunt (2007) in that it takes into account the possibility of patent litigation between former R&D competitors. Their papers consider as endogenous both patent …ling and R&D decisions to establish the existence of a prisoner's dilemma between …rms. By contrast, we consider exogenous patent portfolios, study their impact on market structure and R&D e¢ ciency, and characterize optimal infringement penalties.
In the literature on patent litigation some papers focus on the de…nition of in- However, this approach does not apply well to the case of multi-components technologies. Lemley and Shapiro (2006) focus on situations of hold-up when the patent covers one element of a broader technology. They defend the view that an injunction should not be applied to multi-component technologies when infringement was not voluntary, and emphasize the importance of infringement penalty de…nition. Our paper complements theirs by proposing a rule for de…n-ing optimal infringement penalties.
The model
We consider a model where two …rms (…rm 1 and …rm 2) each undertake R&D investments to develop imperfectly substitutable products that will use the intellectual property that is embodied in its existing patents (and possibly in the existing patents of its rival as well). To keep matters simple we assume that …rms have symmetric R&D functions: …rm i (i = 1; 2) invests 2 x 2 i to be successful with probability x i where > 1.
Each …rm holds patents that it can assert against its competitor. With
product is judged to be infringing one of …rm i's patents by a court of law. The probabilities 1 and 2 are common knowledge so that each …rm is able to anticipate perfectly the issue of litigation.
We normalize the demand side by assuming that the monopoly pro…t is equal to 1 ( M = 1) and the competitive pro…t C is given by
where 2 [0; 1] is a measure of product market's competitiveness given the characteristics of outputs 1 and 2.
The R&D and litigation stages can result in various market structures. Consider …rst that both …rms have developed a product. The following states of nature may then arise:
With probability (1 1 ) (1 2 ) the court rejects both infringement claims.
The …rms become independent competitors on the product market, and each of them gets the competitive pro…t C .
With probability i (1 j ) the court upholds …rm i's infringement claim but rejects …rm j's. In this case …rm i controls an essential technology input for …rm j's activity (at least from a legal viewpoint). It is thus entitled to evict its opponent from the market and enjoy a monopoly position. It gets the monopoly pro…t M while its opponent gets nothing.
With probability 1 2 infringement is reciprocal. Then each …rm controls a key technology input for its competitor's activity. A joint-pro…t maximizing solution consists of one …rm's dropping out of the market and recovering half of the other …rm's monopoly pro…t through a licensing 8 agreement. 6 Assume …rm i (i = 1; 2) successfully innovates, while its opponent fails and claims i's new product infringes one of its patents.
With probability (1 j ) the court rejects the claim, and the innovator fully enjoys the monopoly pro…t M .
With probability j the court upholds the claim. Then the innovator has to pay an infringement penalty r j to …rm j.
The question we address is whether there exists a reasonable, non-negative infringement penalty r i (i = 1; 2) that leads to e¢ cient R&D investments. By reasonable we mean here that r i must satisfy the ex-post voluntary participation and therefore technically require r i 1 for i = 1; 2.
To summarize the above, let k i denote …rm i's expected revenue when …rm k innovates. We have
and i j = j r j ; i; j = 1; 2 and j 6 = i:
When both …rms innovate the expected pro…t to …rm i (denoted 12 i ) is given
4 E¢ cient investment and non-cooperative solution
We de…ne e¢ cient R&D investments as those that maximize the expected pro…ts of a single joint venture company aggregating the R&D capacities of both …rms.
This de…nition is consistent with the standard result indicating that the hold-up problem can be solved ex ante if the patentee and the infringing innovator strike a licensing or joint venture agreement before the R&D costs are sunk (Green and Scotchmer (1995) , Llobet (2003) , Bessen (2004) ). In our model a joint venture would make a monopoly pro…t if at least one product is developed. The corresponding expected pro…t is given by
It is maximized by x = 1= (1 + ). Having de…ned e¢ cient R&D investments, we now turn to the equilibrium investments in the absence of an ex ante agreement. The expected pro…t to …rm i when it invests is given by:
If it chooses not to invest, it can nonetheless extract some revenue using its portfolio. Its reservation payo¤ is then given by:
and the …rm chooses
and 0 otherwise.
Symmetric patent portfolios
As a …rst step we solve the model for an industry in which …rms hold symmetric patent portfolios ( 
novator from a part of her monopoly pro…t. By contrast it can be checked easily that D is increasing in , which is less intuitive. This is due to the e¤ect of patent infringement on the market structure. Any successful infringement claim transforms a competitive product market into a monopoly. Hence stronger patents increase the expected payo¤ of the …rms when both innovate.
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Lemma 1: There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which both …rms invest so as to achieve an innovation success probability x S which is given by
Proof : See Appendix 1.
Strikingly, the equilibrium innovation success probability x S is increasing in M and D . Since decreases M but increases D , how changes in a¤ect x S is ambiguous. Overall we have
It follows directly that the e¤ect of the litigation threat on R&D investments depends on the level of penalty r, and that R&D expenditure can be increasing in the litigation threat. Proof : See Appendix 2.
Investments are decreasing in when r r 0 , and they are inverse U-shaped with respect to otherwise. A high infringement penalty r means that holdup can deprive a single successful innovator from a large part of her monopoly pro…t. This negative e¤ect dominates the market structure e¤ect, and an increase in depresses investments. This case can be viewed as a free-riding pattern. Each …rm has an incentive to let its competitor innovate and to sue it afterwards instead of developing its own innovation at the risk of being sued by its competitor.
If, by contrast, r is small, a successful innovator does not lose much if he is held up by an unsuccessful innovator. Hence the market structure e¤ect dominates, and a higher actually reinforces the incentives to innovate. This …nding implies that, for appropriate (low) levels of infringement penalty, the existence of a litigation threat can actually reinforce R&D investments in comparison with a situation where there is no legal uncertainty (e.g., where = 0).
We now examine how these e¤ects interplay with the e¢ ciency of R&D. Note …rst that the optimal level of investment, which is based on an optimal innovation innovation success probability x = 1= (1 + ), is equal to the equilibrium investment if there is no litigation threat ( = 0) and …rms make no pro…t if they compete in the product market ( = 1). It follows that the additional pro…ts due to imperfect competition on the product market ( < 1) yield socially excessive R&D investments at equilibrium. In other words, …rms start 13 an R&D race in the absence of a litigation threat.
Lemma 3:
On the assumption that = 0, the equilibrium investment is such that the innovation success probability x S = x if = 1 and x S > x if < 1. 
, r = (2 ) + (1 ) (1 )
Proof : Appendix 3. 8 The expression for ( ) can be found in Appendix 3.
Figure 1 here
The …gure above illustrates proposition 1. Equation (7) expresses the optimal balance between free-riding and a patent race. It requires that, conditional on the successful development of an innovation by its opponent, a …rm's expected pro…t from a pure hold-up strategy equals its expected pro…t from investing ef…ciently in R&D. To guarantee r < 1, litigation threats must be su¢ ciently high. As becomes negligible, both the hold-up and the duopoly rents fall, and …rms overinvest even if r = 1. This implies that a strong litigation threat might be not only useful, but also necessary to tame R&D races in sectors where product competition is mild.
Lemma 4:
The optimal infringement penalty r is non-increasing in , , and .
When the litigation threat is such that the …rst-best level of investment can be obtained, the infringement penalty must be calculated according to equation (8) . Lemma 4 summarizes the properties of this e¢ cient penalty. The infringement penalty should be low when competition in the product market is intensive and when R&D is costly, because in this case the R&D race is moderate. Lemma 4 also states that the optimal penalty should decrease as the litigation threat accentuates. This denotes the fact that at equilibrium the threat of litigation generates a free-riding pattern rather than additional incentives to innovate. In this context, and as indicated in equation (7), the probability of infringement and the infringement penalty substitute for each other to maintain the optimal level of expected hold-up pro…t.
Asymmetric patent portfolios
Assume now that …rms hold asymmetric patent portfolios ( 
Lemma 5: For each given values of the parameters 1 ; 2 , and r the equilibrium is unique. It such that both …rms invest in R&D if and only if (9) holds. Otherwise it is such that only …rm 1 invests in R&D.
Proof : See Appendix 4.
The inequality (9) does not hold when 1 r ! 1 and is su¢ ciently high.
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Two di¢ culties arise under asymmetric portfolios. First they induce asymmetric investment strategies even though the …rms have identical R&D functions. Since e¢ ciency requires that both …rms invest the same amount, this is a factor of ine¢ ciency. Moreover, strongly asymmetric portfolios can completely dissuade the …rm with a weak portfolio from undertaking R&D. Then the portfolio works as a barrier to entry.
Proposition 2:
Provided discrimination is possible, setting r 1 and r 2 such that:
,
implements an e¢ cient equilibrium.
The values r 1 and r 2 are such that r 1 < r 2 and such that the …rm with the weakest portfolio has greater expected monopoly rents.
Proof : The e¢ cient investment forms a pooling equilibrium if and only if it solves both best response functions:
Solving for r 1 and r 2 leads to (11) . The proof of the second point is straightforward.
The infringement fees that restore R&D e¢ ciency are comparable with the optimal fee of Proposition 1. Although they are now di¤erent for each …rm, they are similarly decreasing with the strength of the litigator's portfolio, the cost of R&D, and the intensity of market competition.
The expected rent of a patent holder depends once again on the duopoly pro…ts that each …rm would make, except that it is now corrected by the difference in the strength of the two …rms'property rights. As in the symmetric case, the optimal penalty should decrease as the litigation threat accentuates.
This implies that the …rm with the stronger portfolio gets less than its expected duopoly pro…ts conditional on investing e¢ ciently while the …rm with the weakest portfolio gets more. The amount added or deducted from the duopoly rents is proportional and inversely correlated to the cost of R&D ( ).
Since we must have r i 2 [0; 1], the parameters ( 1 ; 2 ) for which r 1 and r 2 are well de…ned are such that i 2 [L ( j ) ; U ( j )] with
for i = 1; 2 and j 6 = i. It is obvious that these boundaries de…ne a non-empty interval. Appendix 5 analyzes the functions U ( ) and L( ) in greater detail. 
Conclusion
The threat of patent hold-up is generally deemed as an impediment to innovation in some industries. In this paper we investigate whether it can be used to balance socially excessive investments when two …rms compete in R&D under the reciprocal threat of patent litigation. We consider a situation where the market structure is determined successively by the probabilistic outcomes of R&D and patent litigation. In this context we characterize infringement fees that allow e¢ cient R&D investments in the overall R&D game.
Depending on the level of infringement fees, we …nd that the reciprocal threat of patent hold-up can either reinforce incentives to innovate or reduce total R&D investments. The …rst e¤ect is due to the positive impact of patent litigation on industry concentration. It dominates when infringement fees are low. As infringement fees increase, it is outweighed by the risk that an innovator will 19 be deprived of part of its pro…ts by an opportunistic patent holder. In this case the reciprocal threat of hold-up creates a free-riding pattern whereby each …rm prefers to let its competitor develop an innovation and then sue it.
We show that optimal R&D investment can be implemented by tuning the infringement fees so that the free-riding e¤ect dominates. This solution can be implemented under some conditions, namely when infringement is su¢ ciently likely and when portfolios are close to symmetric.
High infringement probabilities facilitate the implementation of e¢ cient R&D investments because they increase the investments' sensitivity to the infringement fee. Since both infringement likelihood and infringement fees then reduce incentives to innovate, maintaining the correct level of incentives requires that infringement fees be decreasing in the strength of the infringed patent portfolio. When patent portfolios are symmetric across the industry, this implies that infringement royalties should be lower when the patent portfolios overlap to a greater extent. We …nd that this result can be extended to weakly asymmetric portfolios on the condition that the fees can be di¤erentiated. However, when the patent portfolios are strongly asymmetric, there is no reasonable fee that can implement e¢ ciency. The …rm with the stronger portfolio therefore invests excessively and deters its competitor. The reaction functions are given by
i = 1; 2 and j 6 = i.
The reaction functions are downward sloping since (1
no asymmetric equilibrium in which a …rm invests M while the other invests 0 is possible. The best reply functions cross once and the symmetric equilibrium described in the proposition is unique. In addition, plugging back the best reply into …rm i 0 s pro…t leads to
Thus the participation constraints holds strictly.
Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 2
Claim: Given any 2 [0; 1], there exists a unique r such that dx
Proof: The sign of dx 
Consequently, the above one-to-one relationship implies that for any given r < r 0 there exists a unique r such that dx
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1.
It is possible to implement the socially e¢ cient investment associated with the innovation success probability x S = x if and only if there exists a unique r 2 [0; 1] that satis…es
We have an equality of the form Ar = B where A and B are non-negative.
Hence r is non-negative. All that remains is to identify the set of parameters ( ; ) such that r 1. Consider the following function
There exists a unique r 1; implementing socially e¢ cient investments, if and only if the parameters and are such that F ( ; ) 0. We have The reaction functions are downward sloping.
It is straightforward to verify that S 1 ( 1 ; 2 ) 0 so that the …rst reaction function is downward sloping. For any given j (j = 1; 2) S 2 (:; :) is linear in i .
Let a = If interior, the solution is unique.
Depending on the values of 1 , 2 , and r the above inequality may or may not hold. For instance let 1 = 1, 2 = 0:5, r = 0:98 and = 1. For any > 6:7 we have x 2 > 0 in equilibrium and for any 6:7 we have x 2 = 0 in equilibrium.
Appendix 5: Analysis of the functions U ( ) and L( ).
It is obvious to show that U ( ) > L ( ). We have sign of dU d = 2 + (1 ) + 2 (1 + ) > 0:
Then U (0) > 0 and The left-hand side is an increasing function so that only one 0 solves the equality. Figure 2 , in the text, summarizes the above …ndings.
